

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 DPW-01 AID-20 OMB-01

SAJ-01 DRC-01 /165 W

----- 080086

R 221530Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7064

INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMCONSUL CAN THO

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USDEL JEC PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 WARSAW 6473

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, PFOR, PL, US, VS

SUBJECT: ICCS: US-POLISH BILATERAL RELATIONS

REFS: (A) STATE 247520; (B) WARSAW 6452; (C) SAIGON 21374

(D) WARSAW 6437

1. WHEN WE MET DECEMBER 22, POLISH VICE FOREIGN
MINISTER SPASOWSKI TOLD ME THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT
HAD DECIDED KULAGA WOULD RETURN TO SAIGON ON
JANUARY 3, SO THAT THE COMMISSIONERS COULD RESUME THEIR
WORK IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR.
SECONDLY, HE SAID THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WAS VERY GRATIFIED
THAT THE MISSING PA&E EMPLOYEES HAD BEEN RELEASED.
THIRDLY, HE WONDERED WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING I
COULD TELL HIM ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S MEETINGS IN
PARIS WITH LE DUC THO.

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2. WITH REGARD TO HIS THIRD POINT, I SAID THAT I HAD NOT YET HAD A REPORT ON THE MEETINGS WITH LE DUC THO, BUT WOULD INFORM HIM AS SOON AS SOMETHING WAS AVAILABLE. I TRANSMITTED THE USG'S SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR THE ROLE THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND ITS ICCS DELEGATION HAD PLAYED IN SECURING THE RELEASE OF THE PA&E EMPLOYEES (REF A). HE SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

3. I THEN PROCEEDED AS OUTLINED REF. B, ADDING AT THE END A REFERENCE TO THE DECEMBER 21 ATTACK ON THE THREE ICCS VEHICLES (REF C) AND SAYING THAT I HOPED WE WERE NOT WITNESSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PATTERN OF INDISCRIMINATE ATTACK ON ICCS VEHICLES, BOTH AIRBORNE AND ON LAND.

4. IN RESPONSE, SPASOWSKI SAID THAT HE HAD NOT PLANNED TO OFFER AT THIS MEETING DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF EVENTS IN VIETNAM. HE EXPECTED TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO THIS EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. BUT HE WISHED TO COMMENT BRIEFLY ON THE FIVE PRINCIPAL POINTS I HAD MADE.

5. SADRI ARRANGEMENT FOR PENDING INVESTIGATIONS: TOGETHER WITH THEIR FELLOW-COMMISSIONERS, AMBASSADORS SADRI AND KULAGA HAD ARRANGED TO PROCEED WITH PENDING INVESTIGATIONS. WHEN KULAGA RETURNED TO SAIGON, HE WOULD NOT BE EMPTY-HANDED BUT WOULD HAVE A LOT TO DO. (PARENTHETICALLY, SPASOWSKI REMARKED, KULAGA WAS ANXIOUS TO RETURN TO HIS POST AT SAIGON, ALTHOUGH THE MINISTRY DID NOT EXPECT THAT HE WOULD REMAIN THERE INDEFINITELY. I DEDUCE FROM SPASOWSKI'S COMMENT THAT KULAGA WOULD ASSUME THE CHAIR IN JANUARY AND PERHAPS STAY THROUGH FEBRUARY BEFORE BEING REPLACED.) THE POLISH DELEGATION WOULD FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS, SO FAR AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT. THE GOP POSITION IS THAT THE ICCS SHOULD NOT BE IDLE, BUT SHOULD WORK. IF, BECAUSE OF CIRCUMSTANCES, THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION CANNOT DO ANYTHING, THE GOP WOULD HAVE TO DRAW THE APPRO-

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PRIATE CONCLUSIONS.

6. FIELD TEAMS: OFFICERS OF THE POLISH DELEGATION WERE NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE WORK OF FIVE TEAMS. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THE TEAMS IN THE FIELD WERE DOING VERY LITTLE. IF THE USG SHOULD HAVE SOME APPREHENSION THAT POLISH DELEGATION OFFICERS MIGHT BE WITHDRAWN FROM OTHER TEAMS, AS WELL, "I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE DO NOT

INTEND TO WITHDRAW FROM OTHER TEAMS." SPASOWSKI ADDED THAT THE POLISH MFA HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF THE INITIAL DECISION TO WITHDRAW THE OFFICERS FROM THE FIVE TEAMS.

7. I SAID IT WAS GOOD TO KNOW THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWAL FROM ADDITIONAL TEAMS, BUT WE FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT POLISH OFFICERS RETURN TO THE FIVE FROM WHICH THEY HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. SPASOWSKI HAD SAID THAT THE TEAMS WERE DOING VERY LITTLE. WE FELT WE NEEDED TO STRIVE FOR CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY WERE DOING EVERYTHING PROVIDED FOR IN THE PARIS AGREEMENT. EVEN IN CASES WHERE THE TEAMS WERE INACTIVE, THEIR MERE PRESENCE PLAYED AN IMPORTANT INHIBITORY ROLE.

8. SPASOWSKI AGREED WITH THIS LAST POINT. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR INFLUENCE WAS MINIMAL, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE FOUR-PARTY TEAMS ARE NOT ACCOMPANIED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE SIDES, THE PARTICIPATION OF WHICH HAD TO BE ARRANGED BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PRG AND RVN. "WE SHOULD TRY TO GET THESE TWO SIDES TO AGREE ON A CENTRAL BASIS AND THEN, AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE FIELD TEAMS CAN GO TO THEIR POSTS AND PERFORM THEIR FUNCTIONS".

9. I SAID WE QUITE AGREED AND, INDEED, OBJECTED STRONGLY TO A SITUATION IN WHICH THE FAILURE OF ONE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE SIDES TO AGREE TO OPERATION OF THE FIELD TEAMS CONSTITUTED A VETO ON THEIR DEPLOYMENT AND EFFECTIVE OPERATION.

10. BUDGET: SPASOWSKI SAID THAT THE DRV AND PRG WERE VERY DETERMINED TO KEEP THE BUDGET AT THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENTIAL

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EIGHTEEN MILLION DOLLARS. THEIR VIEW IS THAT THE SIZE OF THE BUDGET IS EXAGGERATED AND THEY CANNOT PAY IT A HIGHER LEVEL BECAUSE THEY MUST DEVOTE THEIR RESOURCES TO RECONSTRUCTING THEIR DEVASTATED COUNTRY. "THEY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO CHANGE THIS VIEW".
DAVIES

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 WARSAW 6473

11. BUT, SPASOWSKI SAID, THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAD DRAWN THE ATTENTION OF THE DRV AND PRG GOVERNMENTS TO THE FACT THAT NEITHER HAD PAID ITS FULL CONTRIBUTION EVEN AT THE LEVEL OF 18 MILLION AND HAD URGED THEM TO MAKE THESE CONTRIBUTIONS.

12. LOOKING AT THE BUDGET, SPASOWSKI SAID WE SEE THAT LARGE SUMS ARE BEING PAID TO US FIRMS WHICH ARE SERVICING THE ICCS. THE POLES ARE NOT SURE THAT THIS IS JUSTIFIED, INCLUDING AS IT DOES ALL THE TRAVEL THAT THESE FIRMS DO. A MORE CAREFUL LOOK AT EXPENSES AND AT WHAT IS PRACTICAL IS NECESSARY. KULAGA HAS BEEN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO LOOK AT THIS PROBLEM TOGETHER WITH AMABSSADOR SADRI AND THE OTHER COMMISSIONERS.

13. POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE: I HAD REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENERAL OFFENSIVE AS A POSSIBLE
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REASON FOR PRG REFUSAL TO PERMIT THE ICCS TEAMS TO OCCUPY THE FIVE SITES PRESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 4D. SPASOWSKI SAID HE WAS NOT A SPOKESMAN FOR THE PRG, BUT "WE DON'T

THINK AN OFFENSIVE IS IN PREPARATION". INSTEAD, THERE IS A LACK OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SVN SIDES; THE PRG IS ANGERED BY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RVN. "IN OUR JUDGMENT, NO SUCH OFFENSIVE IS IN PREPARATION". PERHAPS HE SAID, THERE WERE PEOPLE IN THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT WHO MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SPREADING SUCH RUMORS.

14. DECEMBER 15 HELICOPTER INCIDENT: THE GOP HAD ALREADY SENT PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INCIDENT. SPASOWSKI DEPLORED THE FACT THAT THE INCIDENT HAD OCCURRED AND THAT IT HAD INVOLVED TWO DEATHS AND THE WOUNDING OF A NUMBER OF OTHERS. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A MAJOR QUESTION. IN ITS NOTE TO THE ICCS PROTESTING THIS INCIDENT, THE USG HAD USED THE TERM "COMMUNIST SIDE". THIS LANGUAGE DOES NOT CONFORM WITH THAT USED IN THE PARIS AGREEMENT. "THIS ASPECT OF THE MATTER WILL BE IMMEDIATELY DEALT WITH AT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE ICCS". EVEN IN ITS COVERING NOTE TO THE MFA (FEF D), THE EMBASSY HAD REPEATED THIS LANGUAGE. HE HAD TO TELL ME THAT THE MFA HAD REFRAINED FROM DISTRIBUTING THESE NOTES TEXTUALLY OUTSIDE THE MINISTRY, SINCE HE FEARED A REACTION SUCH AS HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE IF THEY SHOULD BE READ ELSEWHERE IN THE GOP.

15. FINALLY, SPASOWSKI SAID, HE LOOKED FORWARD EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR TO A DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE ON VIETNAM. THE MINISTRY'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO CREATE A BETTER PERSPECTIVE FOR THE FUTURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IT WAS BECAUSE HE BELIEVED EACH SIDE NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND THE VIEWPOINT OF THE OTHER THAT HE WELCOMED THE DISCUSSION WE HAD HAD TODAY.

16. I SAID IT WAS MY OBJECTIVE TO HELP CREATE THAT BETTER PERSPECTIVE TO WHICH HE HAD REFERRED. IT WAS NOT UP TO ME TO SAY WHAT ATTITUDE THE POLISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE ON THE MATTERS WE HAD DISCUSSED. I FELT I SHOULD, HOWEVER, ONCE MORE STRESS OUR CONTINUING STRONG DESIRE TO SEE THE

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ICCS MOVE EFFECTIVELY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT. SOME OF THE POINTS HE HAD MADE GAVE ME SOME HOPE THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME IMPROVEMENT; OTHERS WERE LESS PROMISING. IN PARTICULAR, IT WAS MY HOPE THAT THE POLES COULD USE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE DRV AND THE PRG IN THE DIRECTION OF A MORE REASONABLE APPROACH ON THE BUDGET; WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF FUNDING, THE ICCS WOULD BE CRIPPLED. FINALLY, I SAID, I HOPED THAT WE WOULD NOT GET BOGGED DOWN IN LEGALISTIC ARGUMENTS, SUCH AS THAT WHICH HIS REFERENCE

TO OUR USE OF THE TERM "COMMUNIST SIDE" IMPLIED. THE
POINT CONTINUED TO BE THE READINESS OF THE ICCS TO UNDERTAKE
OBJECTIVE AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATIONS OF INCIDENTS
WHEREVER THEY OCCURRED AND THUS TO STRENGTHEN AND BROADEN
ITS INHIBITORY FUNCTION. I TOO LOOKED FORWARD TO A
FURTHER EXCHANGE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SITUATION IN
VIETNAM AND WAS PREPARED AT ANY TIME TO RESPOND TO HIS
INVITATION TO SUCH A DISCUSSION.

17. ACTION REQUESTED: I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING
A REPORT ON THE SECRETARY'S PARIS DISCUSSIONS WITH
LE DUC THO, THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH I CAN CONVEY TO
SPASOWSKI THE NEXT TIME WE DISCUSS VIET-NAM.
DAVIES

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